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IN THE SUPREl\1E COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JACK~ A. MILLIGAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
MELVIN COY HARWARD, 
KENNETH B. l\1:cDUFFY, 
and C. E. LINDSEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9121 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
MELVIN COY HARWARD 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
In this brief, we shall also refer to the parties as 
they appeared in the Court below. 
\Ve do not fully adopt the State1nent of Facts related 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
by plaintiff in his brief, as they do not properly reflect 
many rnaterial details of the evidence adduced at the 
trial. However, inasmuch as this defendant will recite 
further pertinent facts in the Argument, pertaining to 
the questions of law at issue, we shall not detail them here 
for the sake of brevity. 
Generally speaking, plaintiff's statement of facts 
gives a sufficiently general picture of the facts and 
nature of the litigation, to suffice for that purpose. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY WILFUL MIS-
CONDUCT ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT, HARWARD. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE ADDED RISK OF 
DEFENDANT'S ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE CAUSED BY 
DEFENDANT'S DRINKING. 
A. THERE CAN BE NO JURY QUESTION WHERE 
PLAINTIFF KNEW OF DEFENDANT'S DRINKING, AND 




THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY WILFUL MIS-
CONDUCT ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT, HARWARD. 
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Plaintiff has assun1ed, in his brief, that in order to 
prove wilful misconduct, all that need be shown is that 
the driver intentionally or consciously acted, or failed 
to act, and that an accident then happened. That such 
an argurnent is cornpletely fallacious, seems almost un-
necessary to argue. 
"Unless he be unconscious, any driver of an 
autmnobile is conscious of his conduct." Pettingill 
v. Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 271 P2nd 1038. 
A person who exceeds the speed lin1it; a driver who 
looks to the right when he should have looked to the left; 
a driver who n1erely lights a cigarette and in doing so 
momentarily takes his eyes off the road, all can be said 
to be acting intentionally. But the test of wilful and 
wanton misconduct is of course, a great deal more com-
plex. The Colorado Supreme Court in the Pettingill case, 
(supra) wherein defendant relied on his snow tires and 
did not follow advise to put on chains, and later skidded 
off the highway, states: 
"For the purpose of properly construing this 
statute ordinary or simple negligence should be 
considered as resulting from a passive mind, while 
a wilful and wanton disregard expresses the 
thought that the action of which complaint is made 
was the result of an active and purposeful intent. 
Wilful action means voluntary; by choice; inten-
tional ; purposeful. 
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"Wantonness signifies an even higher degree 
of culpability in that it is wholly disregardful of 
the rights, feelings, and safety of others. It may 
at times, even imply an element of evil. One may 
be said to be guilty of wilful and wanton disregard 
when he is conscious of his misconduct, and al-
though having no intent to injure anyone, from his 
knowledge of surrounding circumstances and ex-
isting conditions is aware that his conduct in the 
natural sequence of events will probably result 
in injury to his guest, and is unconcerned over the 
possibility of such result. 
"A failure to act in prevention of accident is 
but simple negligence; a mentally active restraint 
from such action is wilful. Omitting to weigh con-
sequences is simple negligence; refusing to weigh 
them is wilful." 
"Without realization of the danger, it is un-
realistic to say that he was intentionally heedlessly 
reckless, guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct, 
and disregardful of the safety or rights of his 
guest, or others." 
(Citing Ricciuti v. Robinson, 2 Utah 2d 45, 269 
P.2d 282) (Emphasis added.) 
"Wilful 1nisconduct is the intentional doing 
of an act or intentional omitting or failing to do 
an act, with knowledge that serious injury is a 
probable and not merely a possible result, or the 
intentional doing of an act with wanton and reck-
less disregard of the possible consequences. It in-
volves deliberate intentional or wanton conduct 
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5 
in doing or 01nitting to do an act with knowledge 
or appreciation that injury is likely to result 
therefrom . . . Wilful misconduct connotes a 
greater wrongdoing than mere negligence or even 
gross negligence. It includes a conscious or inten-
tional violation of definite law or rule of conduct 
with the knowledge of the peril to be apprehended 
from such act or failure to act." 
The above was cited with approval in Ricciuti v. 
Robinson, (supra) cited by plaintiff, and in which this 
Court stated : 
"There is no fact or combination of facts in 
the record which showed a wanton or reckless 
disregard of the consequences." 
To permit a jury to deliberate on facts constituting 
simple negligence only, where plaintiff must prove facts 
showing wilful and wanton disregard, would be to com-
pletely destroy the purpose and meaning of the Guest 
Statute, 41-9-1, U.C.A. 1953. 
"There is no evidence from which it could 
sensibly be found that appellant ... was guilty 
of wilful misconduct unless we are to pervert the 
plain meaning of the statute. It is one thing to 
leave questions of fact upon which reasonable 
minds might differ to the decision of a jury, but 
quite another where there is only one possible 
reasonable answer. Certainly the term 'Reason-
able l\Iinds' would here lose all significance as a 
practical, ordinary and common sense measure of 
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conduct were we to so far stray from reality as to 
hold that a mother's protective glance at her young 
child could be considered as wilful misconduct 
even at the time and place where the hazard was 
considerable. Courts have sometimes held that law 
is reason, which we take to mean reason according 
to the standards of ordinary people in everyday 
life. Although appellant turned her head to look 
at the child and disregarded or failed to see the 
stop sign, there is no evidence that her inattention 
to her driving was more than momentary or that it 
was done or continued for any appreciable dis-
tance ... It is admitted that prior to her momen-
tary inattention to her driving appellant was driv-
ing slowly and in a cautious and careful manner. 
A finding of wilful misconduct cannot be predi-
cated upon mere inadvertence or even gross negli-
gence." 
Winn v. Ferguson, 132 Cal. App. 2d 539, 282 P2nd 
515. 
In Neyens v. Gehl, 235 Iowa 115, 15 N.W. 2d, 888, 
where the driver sought to retrieve a lighted cigarette, 
the Court states : 
"We are aware of the principle that ordinarily 
the matter of wilful misconduct is a jury question, 
but not where the facts are such that reasonable 
minds could not conclude that defendant showed 
that type of intention or knowledge, or indulged 
in that type of aggravated negligence necessary 
to create liability on account of wilful misconduct 
in guest passenger cases." 
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A cursory review of Appellant's citations, which we 
will review in the order they appear in his brief, clearly 
renders his own argu1nent untenable. 
Johnson v. l\1arquis, 93 Cal. App. 2nd 341, 209 P 2nd 
63 (at page 6 and page 14) involved facts wherein the 
defendant was driving at speeds estimated from 80 to 100 
miles per hour, on a dark night, with sufficient moisture 
in the air to require windshield wipers, with visibility 
below normal, and on a winding road with sharp curves, 
when she collided into the rear of a truck with lights and 
flares showing. The Court properly held that under those 
facts, coupled with the defendant's drinking, the jury 
was justified in finding the defendant guilty of wilful, 
wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of her guest. 
In Cox v. Johnson (Colorado) 339 P 2nd, 989, (pg 
7 & 14) that Court points out that there was considerable 
conflict in the evidence, but that the jury could have be-
lieved that defendant was warned by plaintiff to slow 
down fron1 his high speed; the highway was icy and 
defendant ignored that fact; the defendant had been 
drinking, and plaintiff was not aware of that fact. 
In Perry v. Schmitt, 184 Kan. 758, 339 P 2nd 36, 
(page 8) the Supreme Court stated: 
"We have never applied the doctrine of as-
sumption of risk as a defense to (a guest case) 
and we are not disposed to do so now." 
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Even so, the evidence showed that the defendant was 
driving at speeds from 80 to 85 miles per hour; that he 
had previously been warned by the sheriff and the high-
way patrol officers to stop speeding; the accident occur-
red on Christmas Eve when the traffic was heavy; he had 
been drinking; and with all those facts the Court held that 
there was enough to be submitted to the jury. 
In Ricciuti v. Roberts, 2 Utah 2nd 45, 269 P. 2nd, 282, 
(pg 99) counsel for appellant has completely overlooked 
the clear meaning of the decision. It is not enough to 
show that the defendant's act was intentional; it must be 
shown that the act was wanton and wilful. 
In Gustaveson v. Vernon, 165 Nebr. 745,87 N.W. 2nd 
395, (p. 10), counsel for appellant has neglected to advise 
that the Nebraska law requires only gross negligence 
which the Court defines as follows: 
"Gross negligence within the meaning of the 
motor vehicle guest statute is great and excessive 
negligence or negligence in a very high degree. 
It indicates the absence of slight care in the 
perfonnance of a duty." 
Furthermore, the facts, not pointed out by counsel, 
were that the defendant was driving a car with a loose 
steering gear; she knew that the car veered if she did 
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not constantly watch her driving; when she moved her 
attention frmn the road, to look back into the back seat 
for a period of four seconds, she did so to play a joke 
upon the plaintiff, in a pre-arranged plan with other 
passengers to surprise plaintiff with her boy friend who 
was hiding on the floor. The Court simply held, there-
fore, that there was a jury question as to whether her 
conduct constituted gross negligence. 
In Dirks v. Gates, 182 Kan. 581, 322 P 2nd, 750, (pg. 
10) there was considerably more evidence than the mere 
fact that the defendant had removed his eyes from the 
road ahead. Plaintiff's brief failed to recite that the 
defendant was engaged in a race with another vehicle 
on a detour; driving at 80 to 85 miles per hour ; he had 
been drinking; and the plaintiff had requested defendant 
to slow down and not to try to pass the other car, which 
the defendant ignored. 
In Topel v. Correz, 273, Wis. 611, 79 N.W. 2nd 253 
(pg 10 and 14) the Court did not hold as claimed by plain-
tiff, that the mere looking at the speedometer constituted 
wilful misconduct. In that case, the Court held that there 
was no evidence in the trial that the plaintiff knew that 
the defendant had had more than one drink; or that he 
had an opportunity to observe defendant's behavior prior 
to the driving; or that the defendant's drinking was in 
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the presence of the plaintiff or known by plaintiff. For 
those reasons, the Court held that there was a jury ques-
tion as to whether the plaintiff knew and appreciated the 
hazard of riding in the automobile driven by the defend-
ant, and therefore assumed the risk of the ride. 
In SIMPSON v. MARKS, 349 Ill. App. 527, 111 
N.E. 2nd 370 (pg 11) the Court pointed out that the de-
fendant himself had testified that he had "gaped" at the 
accident on the other side of the highway, traveled 200 
to 300 yards while looking away and had slowed down 
during that tilne to a speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour. 
The Court held that if the jury believed the defendant's 
version, it was justified in finding in favor of the plain-
tiff. 
IN McGOWAN v. CAMP, 87 GA. App. 671, 75 S.E. 
2nd 350, (pg 11) again, the statute requires the showing 
of gross negligence only and is hardly a proper precedent 
for facts required to show wanton or wilful misconduct. 
The facts also showed that the car was traveling 50 miles 
per hour, defendant had been having difficulty with the 
children, she had looked back several times and before she 
lost control of the car she had taken her eyes off the road 
and tried to strike one of the children, during which time 
the car traveled about 150 feet. 
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In SHOEMAKER v. FLOOR, 117 Utah 434, 217 P 
2nd, 382, (pg 13) the Honorable Court will recall that 
there was evidence that defendant after the trip started, 
wa~ driving at a high speed, on icy roads, and he refused 
to heed the pleas of plaintiff to slow down. 
In DAVIS v. HOLLOWELL, 326 Mich. 673, 40 N.W. 
2nd, 641, 15 A.L.R. 2, 1160, (pg 15) plaintiff inadvertently 
overlooked that the the facts showed defendant was 
speeding; he ignored plaintiff's pleas to slow down; de-
fendant became indignant and swerved from side to side 
on a gravel road purposely, and at 60 miles per hour he 
lost control, all in addition to his drinking. 
In every single case cited by plaintiff, (other than 
gross negligence cases) there were ample facts in evi-
dence from which a jury could properly find wilful mis-
conduct, and under circumstances which the jury reason-
ably could find that the plaintiff did not anticipate such 
conduct. 
We gladly test the facts of the case at bar with the 
above cases. Those cases make it clear that there was no 
jury question in this case. 
The evidence is undisputed that plaintiff, Milligan, 
had full knowledge of this defendant's drinking during 
the evening prior to the accident. 
As to the complete lack of wilful misconduct, we 
turn to the record of the testimony. 
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Plaintiff Milligan testified: 
(R-164) 
Q. When you left the Lackawanna, Mr. :Milligan, 
and started up toward the Noodle House, 
did you observe anything unusual, or that 
caused you any alarm, about the way the car 
was being driven~ 
A. No. 
A. Well, I was all relaxed; just laying over 
there in the car this way (indicating) with 
my arm up over the back of the seat ... I 
was talking to Jim in the back, and Coy. 
And I was riding along just relaxed, I didn't 
pay any attention. 
(R-165) 
Q. Did you feel it necessary for you to pay 
attention to the way the car was being 
driven, or participate in the driving in any 
way~ 
A. Well, I was right there watching it, and 
everything was going along just perfect. I 
couldn't watch for anything different. 
(R-179) 
Q. Now, when he drove the car from the Lacka-
wanna to the scene of the accident, there 
was nothing wrong in the way he drove the 
car~ 
A. Not a thing. 
Q. He drove safely? 
A. Very. 
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Q. And you weren't worried or apprehensive 1 
A. Not a bit. 
Q. The speed of the car was nonnal1 
A. Absolutely. 
~Lr. Finnegan, who testified for plaintiff, fully con-
firmed plaintiff's praise of defendant's manner of driving. 
(R-130) 
Q. Now how did Coy drive from the Lackawanna 
Club to the time of the accident 1 Describe 
his manner of driving. 
A. Oh, he drived very good. As good as any-
body else could drive. 
Q. Was there anything unusual about the speed 
he went1 
A. Nothing unusual about his driving, speeding 
either. (See also R-71) 
The cigarette incident, according to plaintiff, changes 
the above "very good" driving to wilful and wanton mis-
conduct. 11r. Finnegan, whom the defendant states was 
handing him a cigarette, does not recall the incident. (R-
130). The only testimony was from the defendant. 
(R-144) 
A. Well, I didn't see any, any truck ahead of me. 
Right at that time, I asked ... well, Mr. Fin-
negan had lit a cigarette in the back, and I 
asked him to light one for me, which I heard 
the match strike. I turned just ... (illustrat-
ing) 
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Q. Now you are indicating, Mr. Harward, that 
you turned to your right, is that correct1 
A. That is right, just like that. (Indicating) As 
I came back, the impact was right at that 
mon1ent .... I had no time to put on brakes, 
or ... 
Q. If I understand the motion you Inade, you 
turned so that you looked back at Mr. Finne-
gan sitting in the back seat, is that correct! 
A. That is right. I did. Took my eyes off the 
road, that is right. 
Q. In that process, ~lr. Harward, did you turn 
your car out of the traveled portion of the 
inside lane of traffic 1 
A. To my knowledge, no. 
(R-149) 
A. Well, I know that it wouldn't have delayed me 
over one second to make the turn to reach to 
get it. 
The witness on the stand demonstrated his movement 
by turning his head to look over his right shoulder, 
which of course was in the presence of the Honorable 
Trial Judge. There was no indication that he looked in 
the rear seat, other than by 1neans of his peripheral, or 
side vision, as his body during the illustration, was not 
shifted from his seated position. 
These 1nen were all friends; the defendant had of-
fered to buy the plaintiff and Finnegan their meal; en 
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route to the cafe, he admittedly drove very carefully. 
He failed to see the truck parked ahead, and not knowing 
it was there, took his eyes off the road for not more than 
one second. Not even a jury can change those elements 
of "momentary inattention" into an intentional, wanton, 
deliberate act with knowledge that injury is a probable 
consequence and in reckless disregard of the safety of 
his friends and guests. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE ADDED RISK OF 
DEFENDANT'S ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE CAUSED BY 
DEFENDANT'S DRINKING. 
A. THERE CAN BE NO JURY QUESTION WHERE 
PLAINTIFF KNEW OF DEFENDANT'S DRINKING, AND 
THE ACCIDENT WAS NOT THE RESULT OF WILFUL 
MISCONDUCT. 
It is common knowledge that a person's faculties 
for safe driving are dulled and reduced proportionately 
to the extent of liquor consumed. There is, of course, 
more likelihood that a driver who has imbided will be in-
volved in an accident, than a sober person. This likeli-
hood increases to almost a certainty when the driver is 
unquestionably intoxicated. A plaintiff guest knows the 
added risk involved in riding with such a person, and 
by law is presumed to anticipate the probability of an 
accident, and therefore assumes the risk of the ride. 
All well reasoned cases can be rationalized on the 
following basis: 
1. If the driver's drinking was not enough to affect 
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his driving ability, the Guest Statute bars the guest's re-
covery, unless wilful misconduct is shown. 
2. If the driver's ability was impaired, and the 
guest had knowledge of the anwunt so consumed, the 
guest assumes the risk of an accident resulting frmn the 
driver's impaired ability. 
3. If, under No. 2, the driver engages in wilful mis-
conduct, it is a question of fact for the jury as to whether 
the guest should have reasonably anticipated the driver's 
conduct, under the circumstances. 
In the facts of the case at bar, plaintiff knew the 
amount of beer consumed by defendant; he knew, or is 
told by law that he knew, that defendant's ability was 
impaired, whether he were totally drunk, or one quarter 
drunk. The accident was the result of simple or ordinary, 
negligence, and nothing 1nore. The plaintiff is barred 
from recovery, and properly so. 
"The effect of intoxicating liquor in depriving 
a driver of care and caution and inducing physical 
incapacity in the operation of a car is universally 
known and tragically illustrated daily. Where one 
becomes a guest and imprudently enters a car with 
knowledge that the driver 1's so under the influence 
of into1:icants as to tend to prevent him from ex-
ercising the care and caution whi,ch a sober and 
prudent man would cntploy in the operation and 
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control of the car, the guest is barred from re-
covery by reason of his contributory negligence, 
and as having assmned the risk involved. Where 
the evidence of such fact is without conflict, plain-
tiff is barred from a recovery as a matter of law. 
(cases cited) Where the evidence is sufficient to 
raise a question as to plaintiff's knowledge and 
prudence, the determination of that issue must be 
submitted to the jury.'' 
United Brotherhood v. Salter, 167 P 2nd 954 at 958 
(Colo.). 
Bear in mind that plaintiff complains of defendant, 
on one hand, that defendant had been drinking, as the 
basis for his action and yet he encouraged and partici-
pated with defendant in that very act. It matters not how 
much defendant had to drink. If the defendant were in-
toxicated, (a fact we deny the evidence proved) it was as 
apparent to plaintiff Milligan as to officer· Iba. The 
fact that is important is the admitted fact that plaintiff 
was drinking with defendant, drink for drink, during 
the entire evening, and was fully aware of the amount 
consumed inasmuch as he himself had the same amount 
to drink as the defendant. 
The California Courts have adopted, with sound 
reasoning, "The Equal Culpability Rule". The reasoning 
applies to Assumption of Risk, which we submit is the 
same thing: 
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" ... The circu1nstances of the case show that 
the guest was a participant in the drunken orgy 
in all the acts and events which led up to the in-
toxicated condition ... Recovery cannot be had 
for the simple reason that both parties are equally 
culpable." 
" ... The efficient cause in the instant case 
was intoxication, intoxication superinduced by the 
active participation of the plaintiff, and we find 
no line of demarkation seperating the result from 
the cause, upon which the plaintiff can rely, and 
at the same time hold the defendant liable in 
damages." 
Schneider v. Brecht, 6 Cal. App. 2nd 379, 44 
P2nd 662. 
That rule was approved in Price v. Schroeder, 35 Cal. 
App. 2nd 700, 96 P2d 949, wherein the Court states: 
"The Appellant was equally at fault in bring-
ing about the very mental condition of which he 
complains, and which led to the accident." 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff failed to sustain the necessary burden of 
proof to properly establish any question for the jury 
to determine. 
The Honorable Trial Court correctly granted this 
defendant's motion to dismiss. 
The plaintiff had to 1naintain his action on some 
reasonable showing of 'vilful misconduct on defendant's 
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part, which he failed to do. He complains also of the de-
fendant's sobriety, (although he testified defendant was 
sober) and that while he drank drink for drink with de-
fendant during the entire evening, accepted defendant's 
offer of a free meal, enjoyed the careful driving of de-
fendant enroute to the cafe, by some unexplainable rea-
son, plaintiff maintains he should not have anticipated 
the possibility of an accident happening, and that defend-
ant should respond to him in damages. Justice disagrees. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the 
Trial Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E. MIDGLEY 
Attorney f~or Defendant and Respondent, 
Melvin Coy Harward 
1012 Boston Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah 
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